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SYMPOSIUM ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO CRIMINALIZE MARITAL RAPE 
CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE STATE: 
COMMENT ON “CRIMINALIZING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS” 
Julie Goldscheid* 
International human rights frameworks offer powerful support for a range of  reforms to address marital 
rape. Melanie Randall and Vasanthi Venkatesh’s valuable commentary, Criminalizing Sexual Violence against Women 
in Intimate Relationships, correctly shines a spotlight on the extent to which marital rape is still accepted in too 
many countries around the world, and calls for its explicit criminalization under international human rights 
laws.1 The commentary serves as an important reminder of  the challenges and enduring stereotypes that pre-
vent marital rape from being recognized globally as a human rights violation. But the commentary’s focus on 
criminalization as the fundamental response is unduly limited. While criminalization, whether explicit or im-
plicit, is a core part of  states’ obligations under international human rights law, centering criminal justice risks 
both shortchanging other approaches and obscuring the problems with criminal justice interventions. Although 
Randall and Venkatesh acknowledge that criminalization is but one element of  a broader strategy, this essay 
urges a broader view. International human rights laws’ due diligence framework requires a range of  responses 
that include the obligation to prevent, protect, and provide redress, along with the obligation to prosecute and 
punish. Explicitly framing states’ obligations in terms of  that more comprehensive approach would reach 
broadly to address the cultural and social barriers that allow marital rape to continue without sanction. 
Marital Rape and International Human Rights Law 
As Randall and Venkatesh’s commentary recognizes, marital rape should fall within various prohibitions gov-
erned by international human rights law. These include, inter alia, the right to life, freedom from torture, right 
to equal protection, right to liberty and security of  person, and right to health, which are variously protected 
by a number of  international human rights instruments. Some human rights instruments explicitly recognize 
the harm of  marital rape. For example, the Declaration on the Elimination of  Violence Against Women defines 
“violence against women” as encompassing, inter alia, marital rape and other forms of  violence within the family 
(art. 2a), and calls on states to pursue by “all appropriate means” policies to eliminate violence against women, 
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including criminal and other laws, public education campaigns, and social services for survivors and their fam-
ilies.2 
Other international human rights instruments do not explicitly name marital rape as a human rights violation, 
but nevertheless encompass marital rape within their scope. For example, although the Convention on the 
Elimination of  all Forms of  Discrimination against Women, itself  does not reference violence against women, 
General Recommendation 12 requires states to take actions to address violence against women, including sexual 
violence and abuses in the family.3 Those provisions should be interpreted to encompass marital rape, which 
of  course is a form of  sexual violence within the family. General Recommendation 19 explicitly defines violence 
against women as a form of  discrimination and recognizes that traditional attitudes, in which women are re-
garded as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles, perpetuate practices such as family violence and 
abuse,4 and that family violence is one of  the “most insidious” forms of  violence against women.5 The General 
Recommendation calls on states to “take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of  gender-
based violence, whether by public or private act,” and to “ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, 
rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence give adequate protection to all women, and respect their 
integrity and dignity.”6 Similarly, the Convention against Torture has been interpreted to encompass a prohibi-
tion on rape, including rape by private parties when state actors fail to exercise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute and punish those acts.7 Regional treaties, including the Council of  Europe Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (“Istanbul Convention”) and 
the Convention of  Belém do Pará also define violence against women or domestic violence to include all acts 
of  physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within the family.8  
Regardless whether these international human rights instruments explicitly name marital rape, the prohibi-
tions with respect to sexual violence, including sexual violence within the family, combined with the 
instruments’ recognition of  the link between traditional stereotypes and attitudes sanctioning violence against 
women, discrimination against women, and practices involving violence, should lay to rest any question whether 
marital rape falls within these instruments’ ambit.9 Any purported justifications for excluding marital rape from 
 
2 UN Declaration on the Elimination of  Violence against Women art. 4, GA Res. 48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
3 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA Res. 34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979); Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against Women, UN Doc. 
A/44/38 (1989). 
4 Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19, para. 11, UN Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 
29, 1992) [hereinafter CEDAW, General Recommendation 19]. 
5 Id. at para. 23.  
6 Id. at para. 24. 
7 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
UNTS 85. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of  Article 2 by States Parties, para. 18, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) (recognizing that states’ due diligence obligation to address torture “or other ill-treatment” has been 
applied to gender-based violence such as rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, and trafficking); Rhonda Copelon, Gender 
Violence As Torture: The Contribution of  CAT General Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 229, 238 (2008). 
8 See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women art. 2, June 9 1994, 33 ILM 1534.; Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against 
Women and Domestic Violence, art. 3, May 11, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210; see also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 4(2)(a) (July 11, 2003) (requiring 
all states to take “effective measures” to enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against women including unwanted or 
forced sex whether the violence takes place in private or public). 
9 See, e.g., CEDAW, General Recommendation 19, supra note 4, at para.6 (“Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of  
the Convention, regardless of  whether those provisions expressly mention violence.”). 
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prohibitions of  other forms of  rape and sexual violence, are grounded in the very traditional roles and stereo-
types that the international human rights instruments mentioned above recognize perpetuate discrimination.10 
Explicit prohibitions, both in the text of  international human rights instruments themselves and in national 
and local laws, would offer useful clarity and signal strong condemnation. Moreover, absent express prohibi-
tions, lesser-related offenses may allow unwanted sexual contact within marriage to escape review.11  
Decisions in cases brought under a number of  international human rights instruments also reflect interna-
tional human rights tribunals’ recognition that rape and sexual assault, and states’ failure adequately to respond 
to allegations of  rape and sexual assault, violate international human rights prohibitions. Decisions holding 
states accountable for responding to sexual assault in a variety of  contexts underscore that tribunals interpreting 
international human rights instruments define rape and sexual assault in broad terms, and recognize the links 
between traditional discriminatory attitudes and the persistence of  sexual violence.12 The reasoning in those 
decisions would apply as well to cases involving marital rape.  
Due Diligence and State Obligations to Address Marital Rape 
The due diligence obligation articulates states’ human rights obligations and increasingly has been applied to 
gender violence.13 The obligation is widely understood as including an obligation on the state to prevent, protect 
against, prosecute, punish, and provide redress for acts of  gender violence. As such, the obligation encompasses 
criminal justice responses in its obligations to prosecute and punish. But the transformative power of  interna-
tional human rights obligations lies in the scope of  its command and reaches beyond its criminal justice focus. 
By framing states’ obligations to include the obligation to prevent, protect against, and provide redress for acts 
of  gender violence, the due diligence obligation requires a wide range of  responses. The obligation directs 
states to criminalize, but also to provide comprehensive services for survivors, as well as to support programs 
that address the underlying social, cultural, and political biases that allow gender violence, including marital 
rape, to persist.   
 
10 See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Rape Laws Globally: Rationales and Snapshots around the World, in MARITAL RAPE: CONSENT, 
MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 262-265 (Kersti Yllo & Gabriela Torres, eds., forthcoming 2016) 
(discussing justifications for deeming all sexual intercourse between husband and wife as lawful). 
11 See id. at 266-68 (describing additional criteria imposed in charges of  marital sexual assault in the United States that pose barriers 
to successful prosecution). 
12 See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (recognizing states’ obligation to punish all forms of rape and sexual assault in 
a case involving the sexual assault of a 14-year-old woman); Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
S.V.P. v. Bulgaria, No. 31/2011, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (24 Nov., 2012) (recognizing gender violence as a form of 
discrimination against women in a case involving the sexual molestation of minor girl); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, Vertido v. Philippines, No. 18/2008, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (Sept. 22, 2010) (recognizing the role of 
stereotypes and customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women in finding the acquittal of the president of a chamber 
of commerce for the sexual assault of an employee to be a violation of CEDAW); C.K. v. Commissioner of Police, Petition 8 of 2012, 
Kenya Law Reports, Republic of Kenya, High Court at Meru (2013) (recognizing that “defilement” of young women violates funda-
mental rights and freedoms); see also, e.g., C.A.S. v. Romania, App. No. 26692/05 (2012) (repeated sexual assault of seven year old boy 
violated international obligations); González et al. (Cotton Field) v. Mexico, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 
(Nov. 16, 2009) (sexual assaults and murder of young women constituted a form of discrimination). 
13 For a fuller discussion of  states’ due diligence obligations with respect to gender violence, see, e.g., Julie Goldscheid & Debra J. 
Liebowitz, Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301 (2015). 
2015 CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE STATE 205 
 
That broader reach is critical. Although Randall and Venkatesh acknowledge that criminalization must be 
supplemented by other approaches, such as public education and prevention programs, centering criminaliza-
tion poses a risk that other approaches will be shortchanged or ignored.14 Moreover, criminal justice responses 
have proved problematic. Survivors may be reluctant to seek criminal justice interventions, even when they are 
available, for multiple reasons.15 Sexual violence committed by state actors, whether the military, paramilitary, 
or other law enforcement officers, may leave many survivors skeptical of  the response they will receive if  they 
call police.16 Police bias against women, as well as their biases based on race, sexuality, poverty, and migrant 
status, also leave many reluctant to seek criminal justice interventions.17 For LGBT survivors, particularly those 
in countries that criminalize private, consensual, same-sex behavior, criminal justice responses are effectively 
meaningless.18 Many survivors who live in communities subject to mass incarceration will not seek out addi-
tional criminal justice interventions.19 Survivors may resist police intervention because they fear their children 
will be taken away as a result; immigrant survivors may fear that they or their partners will be subject to depor-
tation; survivors with criminal records, those who are sex workers, and those with histories of  mental illness or 
drug addiction may fear that they will risk being arrested if  they report abuse.20 Even when marital rape is 
criminalized, survivors may not seek prosecution since the process is time consuming, often inefficient, and 
frequently subjects the “victim” to intrusive questioning they may experience as retraumatizing.21 Moreover, 
many survivors want the abuse to stop, but for reasons ranging from economics to love, may not want to see 
their partner arrested.22  
Finally, noncriminal justice related interventions are key to assisting survivors and ending abuse. Even if  
marital rape is criminalized, survivors need services ranging from counseling, to economic interventions such 
as employment, housing and other financial assistance. While criminalization may signify societal condemnation 
and may in some cases lead to punishment for the perpetrator, it affords an ex post facto remedy that does not 
offer practical assistance to survivors or directly address root causes. As Randall and Venkatesh rightly observe, 
even where marital rape is criminalized, implementation and enforcement problems remain. The human rights 
 
14 See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Domestic Violence as Sex Discrimination: Comparing American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 355, 389 (2006) (noting criminal justice-related reforms as the most common measures taken to meet international obligations 
under CEDAW, based on review of  country reports submitted to Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women). 
15 See, e.g., National Domestic Violence Hotline, Who Will Help Me? Domestic Violence Survivors Speak Out About Law Enforce-
ment Responses (2015) (finding, inter alia, strong reluctance to turn to law enforcement for help among survivors who had called the 
police, as well as those that had not called the police).  
16 See, e.g., Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 13, at 213; see also, e.g., AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM, SAY HER NAME: RESISTING 
POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2015).  
17 For a collection of  research, and a recent study of  service providers in the United States, see, ACLU ET AL., RESPONSES FROM THE 
FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING (2015) [hereinafter ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD]. 
18 Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 13, at 315. Of  course, prohibitions of  marital rape would not aid LGBT survivors in jurisdic-
tions that criminalize private, same-sex behavior, where both parties would be subject to sanction regardless of  any questions about 
consent, autonomy or choice. This inherent limitation in the reach of  efforts to eliminate marital rape confirm the value of  broad-based 
advocacy that reaches both beyond criminalization and beyond marriage. 
19 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); see generally, 
e.g., ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 17 (detailing reasons survivors in marginalized communities are reluctant to call 
police). 
20 ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 17, at 7-9 (reviewing research), 40-42 (reporting survey results). 
21 Id. at 30-31. 
22 See, e.g., id. at 2, 43; see also, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse 
Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008). 
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framework supports a comprehensive response by highlighting prevention as a core state response and by un-
derscoring the need to shift underlying biases and social norms. Particularly since questions remain about what 
mix of  policy and legal responses are most effective, multiple strategies are needed.23  
Randall and Venkatesh’s important arguments should inspire policy-makers in international and national fora 
to make clear that marital rape violates international human rights laws. While explicit criminalization should 
be a part of  states’ responses, laws, policies and programs that advance states’ obligations to prevent, protect, 
and provide redress should be prioritized as well to promote the symbolic and practical interventions needed 
to support transformational and lasting change. 
 
 
23 See, e.g., Claire M. Renzetti et al., Building the Knowledge Base: Research Funding through VAWA, CUNY L. REV. FOOTNOTE FORUM 
(2014). 
